This paper develops and estimates a model for the bonus-crediting mechanism in relation to with-profits policies issued by Danish life insurance and pension companies. The market for pension and life insurance savings contracts is generally highly opaque, but our proposed model explains a significant part of the variation in actual bonus distribution by Danish market participants.
Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium there has been a huge increase in public concern over the financial health of life insurance and pension companies (L&P companies) in several countries.
Especially in the wake of the stock market crisis that followed the events of September 11, 2001 , the solvency of the L&P industry has been an item of high priority on financial supervisory authorities' agenda. Some governments have taken emergency steps to ease the situation, including the relaxation of regulation, tax changes and increased supervision in order to prevent L&P companies from collapsing. 1 Many companies have on their side been forced to sell equities in order to get a better asset match for their pension liabilities and to comply with required solvency ratios, thereby perhaps to some extent accentuating the stock market crisis. 2 In addition, new fair value or market based accounting standards are under way which will inevitably increase the transparency of balance sheets in the L&P industry. 3 This should, ceteris paribus, increase the exposure of and pressure on companies with solvency problems.
The recent period of turmoil is nevertheless only a symptom of more fundamental solvency problems in the L&P industry in many countries. Prior to September 11, several companies already faced problems related to the differential between low market interest rates and their guaranteed policy interest rates (see Briys and de Varenne (1994) , Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) ).
The most notable example of this is the case of Equitable Life, the world's oldest life insurance company, which incurred severe financial difficulties during 1999-2000 due to their with-profits policies issued with guaranteed annuity rates. Equitable Life looked in vain for a 'white knight', was forced to close to new business, and barely stayed solvent.
Since a large part of the life insurance and pension markets in the OECD countries rely 1 In Denmark one of the largest pension funds, PFA, faced severe problems in the period following the events of September 11, 2001 , and was forced by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority to adopt a plan for restoration of company capital. 2 For example, the UK based Boots Pensions Scheme recently announced that it had sold all equities and switched its entire £ 2.3 billion fund into long-dated sterling fixed rate bonds. Quite notably, this strategic move was completed just prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 . Boots is among the 50 largest UK pension funds (The Boots Company (2001)). 3 The US Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have long been occupied with the concept of fair valuation of liabilities as illustrated by a series of issued statements of standards during the 1990s (see Grosen and Jørgensen (2002) for more on this). In Britain the controversial FRS 17 was published in November 2000. This new accounting standard explicitly requires companies to apply a consistent basis to their pension cost and to value pension fund assets and liabilities on a market basis. In the EU pension and insurance companies will be required to adopt the market based accounting standards proposed by IASB from January 1, 2005 at the latest.
heavily on with-profits type of funds (a.k.a. participating policies) equipped with embedded interest rate options, policy issuers have been challenged by the fact that the general level of interest rates has fallen over the last two decades. As a consequence of this fall, the interest rate guarantees embedded in typical policies have become valuable and these options are now in many cases a threat to company solvency. The situation is sometimes aggravated by the fact that contracts are also issued with other options against the insurer, for example an option for the policy owner to sell back the policy before maturity -a so-called surrender option.
In response to the development in the general level of interest rates most companies have lowered the level of their guaranteed interest rate on new policies. As regards existing policies, terms and conditions cannot generally be changed to the policyholder's disfavor, but there are in fact examples of companies having attempted to deal with the potential solvency problems by changing terms or even suspending the various options and promises embedded in 'old' policies. While downward adjustments to the level of distributed profits would have been another natural response, the booming stock markets of the 1990s largely prevented such an evolution. In fact, after tax policy interest rates have generally fared better than after tax yields on government bonds, and many companies have responded to the decade's positive evolution in stock markets by increasing the weight of equities in their portfolios. 4 As a result, companies are now extremely vulnerable, not only to further declines in interest rates but also to negative corrections in the stock markets. It is, of course, difficult to predict how these and future changes in the investment opportunity set will influence surplus distribution in the future. The exact determinants of bonus distribution to customers in L&P companies and pension funds are indeed very hard to identify and with-profit funds are generally extremely opaque. 5 The detailed considerations underlying bonus distribution decisions are not publicly available and data in this connection are also hard to find. As a natural consequence there is to the best of our knowledge no previous empirical work in this area and the present paper is an attempt to start filling this gap.
In a previous theoretical paper ( Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) ) we have developed a simple bonus-crediting model and the purpose of the present paper is to estimate and test this model.
More specifically, we test empirically whether our proposed model is a good description of the actual interest rate crediting behavior of the six largest Danish L&P companies during the period 1991-2000. 6 The model is shown to fit the data well and this allows us to conclude that when estimated, our model for the bonus-crediting mechanism may assist consumers in comparing policies and regulators to determine if, for example, the bonus distribution policy is fair, prudent, and justified.
The main basis for the empirical analysis is a unique hand-collected data set consisting of policy interest rates and various key figures and solvency ratios for the companies in our sample.
The key figures and ratios related to company solvency were introduced as a compulsory part of the accounting statement of Danish L&P companies from 1995 and onwards. With their first disclosure the insurers had to provide comparable figures four years back which explains the span of our data set of the 10 year period from 1991 to 2000. 7 The six companies in our sample represent approximately 55% of the life insurance and pension savings market in Denmark.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present additional detail on the Danish L&P sector with special emphasis on embedded options and guarantees on the liability side.
Section 3 briefly introduces the theoretical model first proposed in Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) .
In particular the developed bonus-crediting formula is presented. Section 4 describes the data in more detail and in section 5 the econometric method is presented. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 6 and the final section concludes.
Background on the Danish L&P Sector
In this section we briefly describe some essential institutional aspects of the Danish L&P sector which has expanded dramatically over the past 10 to 15 years. This expansion has been partly related to the creation of new market pension schemes and a doubling of labor market pension coverage during the period from 1989 to 1993. Companies with very different profiles are represented in the Danish L&P market. Firstly, some companies are predominantly life insurance companies while others are predominantly pension insurance companies. Secondly, 6 These six L&P companies are AP, Codan, Danica, PFA, Topdanmark and Tryg. 7 See The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (1995).
some companies are primarily involved in commercial insurance while others are more heavily engaged in compulsory collective insurance. Finally, some companies are publicly held -they need to produce a return to their shareholders -while others redirect any surplus in full to the insured.
In 1982 Danish L&P companies agreed on a common tariff, G82, as their mutual actuarial basis of calculation. The maximum technical rate in G82 was 4.5%, 8 and most policies issued on the basis of G82 contain an explicit guarantee that the policyholder's account will be credited -on a year-to-year basis -with a policy interest rate of at least 4.5% after pensions tax. 9 This interest rate was well below prevailing interest rates in the bond market -even after taxationin the early 1980s, as figure 1 illustrates. The figure also shows that 1982 was followed by a period where market interest rates generally declined. In Denmark -as in most other countries (see Grosen and Jørgensen (2002) ) -neither the regulatory authorities nor the L&P industry reacted quickly to this development. It was not until 1994 that the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) in Denmark announced that the maximum interest rate that could legally be guaranteed to policyholders was lowered from 4.5% to 2.5%. Later, in 1999, the maximum interest rate was further cut to 1.5%.
This late reaction to the dramatic narrowing in the safety margin between market interest rates and the issued interest rate guarantee is a major reason for the solvency problems that many L&P companies have faced in the 1990s and, as can be seen from the after-tax interest rate series in figure 1 , the Danish pensions tax introduced in 1984 strongly aggravated the problems by depressing further the investment return L&P companies were able to generate on their predominant (domestic) bond market investments. In this connection it should be noted that a new pensions taxation system was introduced in 1998 when the tax rate as well as the tax base were changed. The previous taxation scheme was rather complicated and based on real income and a variable tax rate leaving at most 3.5% in real return to the pension capital, while the new system was based on nominal income and a flat 26% tax rate. Until 1998 only bond returns were included in the tax base but subsequently also stock returns were taxed at a 8 For a more detailed description of the common Danish tariff system from 1982, see K" uhle and PerchNielsen (1996) . 9 There is an ongoing debate on whether the issued return guarantees are promises on a year-to-year basis or promises of an average minimum return over the life of the contracts. Today many L&P company managers claim that their companies have issued average-rate guarantees. This is often in conflict with the contents of earlier customer letters and marketing material. flat 5% tax rate. Both tax rates were changed to 15% in 2000. Jan-76
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The development of market interest rates since 1982 and the resulting cuts in the maximum guaranteed interest rate are crucial in understanding the composition of the existing liability side of the Danish L&P industry. In 1994 most companies not only lowered the interest rate guarantee but also responded to the potential solvency problems by omitting the usual associated surrender option from new policies. As regards this option the contracts were thus changedusing standard options theory parlance -from American to European type contracts. 10 As a result, it is now quite common for the L&P companies to have policyholders with different types of interest rate guarantees in the same fund. Clearly, such a situation could potentially lead to an inequitable treatment of different classes of policyholders and the Danish FSA therefore requires companies to report a decomposition of the total amount of contracts by interest rates guaranteed. guarantee levels for the entire sector as well as for the six L&P companies selected for the bonus analysis presented in this paper. 11 As can be deduced from the totals in table 1, the six L&P companies selected for the bonus policy analysis in this paper constitute approximately 55% of the total life insurance and pension market in Denmark. 11 The Danish FSA has kindly provided the data from which table 1 has been constructed. The distribution of outstanding liabilities by the level of interest rate guarantee is entirely new, but some reporting errors are evident in the FSA material as the sum of the liabilities at each interest rate guarantee level does not sum to the reported total sum of liabilities. The latter amounts to 90,588 million euros whereas the entries in the table sum to 85,893 million euros. The breakdown into European and American type contracts is also subject to some uncertainty.
The Model
In this section we present a model for the bonus policy of an L&P company. This model was first developed in Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) where a fuller account of the theoretical foundation and justification can also be found.
The modeling of the L&P company's bonus policy takes a simplified time W balance sheet as its point of departure, as shown in figure 2 below.
Figure 2
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This balance sheet is meant to relate to a single single premium policy (or a cohort of identical policies) initiated at time zero. 12 On the asset side $W denotes the time W market value of the assets backing the issued liabilities, i.e. policies. The liability side is comprised of two entries. 3 W is the policyholder's account balance and we can thus think of 3 W as the funds set aside to cover the contract liability -i.e. it is a distributed reserve. The second liability side entry, %W, represents an undistributed reserve. The purpose of maintaining an entry such as %W is obviously to protect the policy reserve from unfavorable fluctuations in the asset base as well as the risks associated with changes in actuarial variables like e.g. mortality.
Hence, the function of the buffer is to protect the company from incurring solvency problems.
In practice %W is therefore often referred to simply as the buffer. Note that we do not separate what could be labeled bonus reserves -the part of undistributed reserves intended for future distribution to policyholders -and equity. Both of these are included in the buffer.
The idea of the theoretical model is to model the dynamics of the balance sheet entries over time. But before turning to that issue, let us note that the policy reserve, 3 W, is a nominal book value, whereas %W is a sort of hybrid being (defined as) the difference between a market value item, $W, and a book value item, 3 W. This may appear a bit strange, but it corresponds to recent years' practice in many L&P companies. 13 We are thus trying to model actual L&P company behavior rather than attempting to devise a correct way.
As noted above, modeling the bonus policy of an L&P company involves modeling the evolution through time of the balance sheet in figure 2 . In particular we are interested in modeling the discretely compounded policy interest rate process, U 3 W, for W i s I 7 J. This interest rate connects consecutive balances in the policyholder's account via the relation
which further implies
We note that time is measured in years, that 3 W is updated annually, and that the U 3 W's are annualized rates as in real life contracts. Now, let us focus on the crucial specification of the mechanism that determines each year's policy interest rate. Elsewhere (Grosen and Jørgensen (2000)) we have proposed to model the policy interest rate process as follows
where U * is the guaranteed annual policy return, and where m and o are constant parameters.
An equivalent but more easily interpretable specification is the following
where
In interpreting (3)-(4) note first that U 3 W is the policy interest rate which applies between time points W b and W, and that this rate is thus determined and observed at time W b , i.e. it 13 The L&P industry may be viewed as being currently in a stage of transition from a state where book values (amortized costs) were used throughout the balance sheets, to a new state where market or fair values are used everywhere in the balance sheets. This transition has involved moving through a temporary state where market values were applied on the asset side only. The application of fair value accounting to the liability side involves greater challenges and will take more time to fully implement. See also the discussion in Grosen and Jørgensen (2002) . is a predictable process. This construction is again motivated by practice where policy interest rates for year W are typically announced by the companies in mid-December of year W b .
A closer examination of (4) reveals the logic of referring to it as a bonus distribution mechanism: The policyholder will always receive a return of at least U * , but this promised rate may be topped off with bonus depending on the degree of solvency b % 3 c in the company. The bonus mechanism is thus really the second term on the right hand side of (4), and it can be seen that a bonus interest rate will apply when the buffer (the undistributed reserves) is sufficiently large compared to the policy reserves (the distributed reserves). The exact bonus rate in any given year is determined by the parameters m and . We will refer to m and as the distribution ratio and the critical buffer ratio respectively, and the reason for this terminology should be obvious: If the actual buffer relative to the policy account balance exceeds the critical level,
, of that ratio, the company will distribute a fraction, m, of the surplus. Bonus policies with relative low m's and high 's can thus be classified as conservative whereas bonus policies with the opposite characteristics can be labeled aggressive. A neutral policy scenario has a more moderate choice of parameters.
In a theoretical exploration of the properties (fair contract premiums, ruin probabilities etc.)
of a mechanism such as (3)-(4), the dynamics of $W should be modeled as well, e.g. by some stochastic process. See Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) for an example. We need not be concerned with this aspect in the present empirical paper where we have observed time series of %c 3c for a number of companies. The bonus crediting mechanism proposed above depends on just three parameters, U * , m, and . In practice, the guaranteed interest rate is observable which leaves us with just two parameters to estimate.
The Data
For each company specific estimation of the two parameters m and in the proposed bonus distribution mechanism we need time series of the relative buffer, %c 3c , and of the policy interest rates. Furthermore, the minimum interest rate is required. In the present section we discuss how these data were obtained.
As mentioned in Section 1 our estimation of the model will rest mainly on a unique, hand- The first is that it is only meaningful to analyze firms at the group level, and the second is that we should use the consolidated key figures for the six companies for purposes of estimation.
As regards the various interest rates we simply collect the policy interest rates (the U 3 c's)
directly from the companies. The guaranteed return (U * ) is fixed at 4.5% throughout our analysis, although the actual contractually specified rates range from 0% to 4.5% as also documented and discussed earlier (table 1). The reason for this simplification is twofold. Firstly, we have already documented that a large majority of existing policies are in fact issued with 4.5% guarantees. Secondly, it is an observable fact that no L&P company has ever differentiated between different classes of policyholders and announced policy interest rates to some clients that were 14 This data set was kindly placed at our disposal by Kirstein Finansrådgivning A/S, a Danish investment consulting firm. See also Kirstein Finansrådgivning (2001) . 15 In Denmark as well as in the other EU countries the capital requirement is still connected to the liability side of the balance sheet. This principle originates from Article 18 and 19 of the First EU Life Insurance Directive of March 5th, 1979. According to the present Danish capital adequacy legislation for L&P companies, the capital requirement consists of two elements. The first element is simply 4% of the policy reserves. On top of that a small premium is added to allow for the cost of hedging the actuarial risks. This element usually amounts to approximately 0.5% of the policy reserves.
lower than the company's highest interest rate guarantee. All six companies in our sample have a significant amount of contracts issued at the 4.5%-level. These are interesting observations in their own right and also very relevant when discussing the issue of possible inequitable treatment of different classes of policyholders due to differences in the level of their guaranteed interest rates.
Econometric Approach and Model Estimation
It will prove useful to slightly rewrite the theoretical model of section 3 in order to make it more amenable to econometric analysis. We do this in the first part of this section and then we move on to explaining and implementing the maximum likelihood (ML) approach to estimating the model.
Introducing a superscript L to index the different firms, a subscript on the distribution ratio coefficient, and expanding slightly, (4) becomes
As explained in the previous section, our data for estimating this relation consists of time series of U L 3 W and of the relative buffer % L Wb 3 L Wb for six consolidated L&P companies, i.e. L .
For notational ease we therefore define
so that we can specify our statistical model corresponding to (5) as
We note that the additional assumption of a normal distributed error term is common in similar applications. It is also crucial for the maximum likelihood approach to be described shortly.
The dynamic model (9) Amemiya (1985) .
From a theoretical perspective the maximum likelihood technique is superior to other estimation methods in several respects. Most importantly the ML estimator can be shown to be consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal. Moreover, since the asymptotic variancecovariance matrix can be identified, this approach delivers the much needed standard errors of the parameter estimates. The main drawback of the ML approach is that the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates is indeed an asymptotic result, which of course means that the approach is best suited for a situation where you have a lot of data. Unfortunately, this is not exactly what characterizes our present situation. We have high quality data, but it is limited in quantity, so the ML results reported in the next section should be interpreted with appropriate caution.
The appendix to this paper derives the likelihood function, lists the variance-covariance matrix, and provides more detail and appropriate econometric references. 16 The name is a reference to Tobin who developed the model, see Tobin (1958) . 17 In a previous version of this article results from the numerical LS approach as well as the ML approach were reported. In some cases the results of the two methods were quite different. in parentheses below) for each of the six Danish L&P companies. 18 For each company specific estimation we also report a couple of Goodness-of-fit measures -a Root-Mean-Squared-Error (RMSE) and an 5 .
Estimation Results and Discussion

Table 2
Estimates of Bonus Policy Parameters (Standard errors) and Goodness-of-fit measures , is obtained using (8) along with the Delta-method (see e.g. Greene (2003)).
ML Estimates Fit measures
As regards the Goodness-of-fit measures of table 2 it is observed that the RMSE and 5
measures agree that the model fits the Codan data best, whereas the fit to the Danica and Topdanmark data is less impressive. However, 5 's of approximately 30% are still not bad. 19 The quality of the model's fit can also be visually assessed in the figures below where we have plotted the time series of actual and modeled policy interest rates for all six companies.
Inspection of these figures confirms that the model is able to capture variation in the policy interest rates quite well. However, some large fluctuations in bonus distribution can be observed An alternative visualization of the model's fit to the data can be obtained by plotting the U 3 c's (model and actual) against the explanatory variable %c 3c . Figure 4 shows this type of plot for the case of Codan.
Figure 4
Model Returning to table 2 we observe that the bonus distribution parameter estimates imply no clear ranking of the six companies in terms of which is more "aggressive" or which is more "conservative" with their bonus policy. Codan, for example, has a high distribution ratio (aggressive) but also a high critical buffer (conservative), and in general companies with a high distribution ratio may of course compensate for this by raising the critical buffer level and vice versa. However, Topdanmark, AP, Tryg, and Danica can be ranked in that order in terms of aggressiveness with Topdanmark as the most aggressive. Topdanmark has a higher distribution ratio and a lower critical buffer than AP and so on.
A different perspective on this ranking issue can be obtained from making specific assumptions regarding the stochastic process generating investment returns and then performing numerical simulations to determine contract values and/or investigate ruin probabilities implied by the present parameter estimates. To briefly illustrate this point we provide table 3 which contains default probabilities for the six companies estimated by way of Monte Carlo simulation. 20 We have simulated a 20-year scenario with different assumptions regarding the expectation (x) and volatility (}) of the market rate of return. We assume a bonus distribution mechanism as 20 The reported probabilities are estimated on the basis of 1 million simulated scenarios.
modeled in this paper, and for each individual company we apply our estimates of the bonus policy parameters reported in table 2 along with a guaranteed interest rate of 4.5%. We use the geometric Brownian motion as the financial market model (see Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) for further detail). Default is defined as a situation where the buffer account is in deficit at maturity, i.e. after 20 years in this particular example.
In fine accordance with intuition table 3 shows that default probabilities increase in the volatility and decrease in the expected market rate of return. Quite notably it is observed that an expected rate of return in the order of 10% combined with a moderate volatility of around 10% is necessary to bring default probabilities down to around 5%.
Given the statistical uncertainty which after all surrounds our bonus policy parameter estimates we should be extremely careful in interpreting company specific default probabilities, but it is noteworthy that PFA emerges as the company with the highest probabilities of default.
PFA has been through difficult times lately and, as mentioned in footnote 1, has recently been forced by the Danish FSA to adopt a plan for restoration of capital. Although the differences in default probabilities are small across companies, Danica and Tryg emerge as top boys of their class. This result is also in fine correspondence with market experts' general perception of the six companies analyzed in this paper.
Table 3
Default Probabilities Implied by Bonus Policy Parameter Estimates in Table 2 x As indicated earlier we are generally quite pleased with how well the model explains the variation in the data. Still, there might be room for improvements by including other explanatory variables in our policy interest rate model. In this respect it might be fruitful to consider the competitive environment and include some measure of the level of competition in the L&P market. There is no doubt that in practice the policy interest rate can be and is used as a powerful competitive weapon. Recall in this respect that the policy interest rate is announced the year before it is applied, and in addition to this, forecasts of future policy interest rates are commonly published and used in marketing these L&P products, although the application of forecast beyond the first year is subject to strict regulation. One might therefore expect limited variation in the policy interest rates announced by different companies in any given year, and that is confirmed by figure 5 which plots the time series of policy interest rates for the six companies included in our study. These time series are clearly highly correlated and this could be an indication of either an oligopoly or a highly competitive market for life and pension insurance. The exact correlations are provided in table 4.
Figure 5
After The time series of the explanatory variables used so far -i.e. the relative buffers -are also clearly positively correlated (see figure 6 and table 5) although not quite to the same extent as the policy interest rates. The strong positive correlation between relative buffers is not surprising. The size of the relative buffer is determined by investment returns as well as the bonus distribution policy. L&P companies tend to hold similar and well-diversified investment portfolios (partly dictated by law) and investment returns across firms are therefore positively correlated. The slightly lower correlation in policy interest rates can be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that variables other than just the surplus distribution ability we have suggested might prove significant in explaining the actual bonus crediting behavior. Inclusion of an appropriate additional explanatory variable measuring the level of competition may also benefit the precision with which the current parameters are estimated. We intend to pursue these issues in future research.
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Figure 6
Relative Buffer in Six Largest Danish L&P Companies 
Conclusions
We have proposed and estimated a simple model for the bonus-crediting mechanism of Danish life insurance companies and pension funds. The estimated model provided a good description of the data and valuable insights were gained into how bonus policy is determined in practice.
Since with-profits contracts are the predominant vehicle for pensions savings in many countries
we suspect that our model may have wider applicability than to the Danish market alone.
Although there is clearly more to be learned, the present paper represents an important first step forward in the empirical analysis of this market. The model could be extended in several directions. We have pointed out that the level of competition in the market (however measured)
is probably another key determinant of actual policy interest rates. Other candidates to include as explanatory variables are actuarial variables like mortality, surrender intensity, and other parameters which also affect the determination of premiums. The transition to market value based accounting standards in the coming years will also become a challenge for the L&P sector. One of the consequences of introducing market value based accounting principles will be an increased volatility of assets and liabilities and therefore, presumably, also increased buffer demands.
During the course of our analysis we devised an econometric maximum likelihood procedure for estimating the theoretical model. The ML approach has all the desired statistical properties for inference and testing, but is based on asymptotic distribution results. We did not have a large data set so estimation of the model should be repeated as more data inevitably becomes available. The ML method can easily be extended to allow for more explanatory variables, cf.
our earlier discussion. As more data becomes available it might also be interesting to apply a panel data approach to test for example for identical bonus policy across different companies.
On a final note we mention that the bonus mechanism parameters and default probabilities estimated in this paper can be viewed as a new tool to rank and compare with-profits contracts.
Stated differently, the model we have developed and estimated has made the bonus-crediting mechanism of with-profit funds explicit rather than implicit. The gained transparency has the potential not only to help consumers to compare policies, but it could also be used by regulators to evaluate solvency and by companies to compete more effectively in different markets. where 
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